The Colorado River is the major surface water resource of the outhwest . In spite of John Wesley Powell's forecast that the region ou Id never be useful or inhabited, the river basin has been fought over°b d romanticized more than any western river . Certainly, it has been the uhject of more writing -from geomorphology to politics -than any her western river . Nadeau (1950) wrote of the Owens Valley contro-%' rsy and of the heroic attempts to conquer the Lower Colorado River . errell (1965) described in detail the political battle between Arizona nd California over the waters of the Lower Basin, and Fradkin (1968) touchingly described the great changes in the river that have come about hrough human attempts to control and harness its forces . Throughout this history, the influence of the financial power and the concentration of political power on water issues have dominated the policy scene, and since passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902, the federal government through the Bureau of Reclamation has been the agent of project construction and water supply provision .
The Upper Basin has grown more slowly than the Lower Basin -a typical pattern for development for river basins -generally owing to the superior climate, soils, and accessibility of the Lower Basin . Because the Colorado River's waters are produced primarily by snowmelt in the mountains of Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah, this uneven growth pattern has created a pattern of mutual fears between Upper and Lower asins, the former fearing that the latter would establish title through *The physical description of the basin is taken mostly from Howe, 1977 . The institutional aspects are drawn from Howe and Murphy, 1981 . 169 early use, the latter fearing the former might eventually develop to a point at which it would be using much of the river's water . This competition is still present, sometimes explicit, sometimes under the surface, and it helps explain much of the current political and legal maneuvering in the basin.
The Upper Basin is perceived as a water-short area, and it appears to be in terms of low rainfall and runoff : 10 inches per year and 124 acrefeet per square mile per year . Yet its water supply is not really lowland precipitation and runoff, but the melting mountain snowpack, a supply that is widely distributed through the region in natural streams and man-made distribution systems . According to the U .S . Geological Survey, more than 70 percent of all man-made diversions of this supply are directed toward agriculture, and more than 90 percent of all consumptive uses occur in agriculture . The prospects of large-scale energy development that dominated water and environmental concerns a decade ago (for example, Spofford, Parker, and Kneese, 1980) have now largely faded from view . The projections of water use and population have fallen in keeping with the slower growth . Projected agricultural water use needs to be reduced to reflect the oversupply of agricultural commodities nationally and internationally, combined with an increasing reluctance of the federal government to subsidize new irrigation water supply .
It is a major contention of this study that the Upper Basin is not and will not be short of r water II i f tLlle states Ui lr1C basin their -f`h __i_ use t supplies p l : ueS In ail economically reasonable way . Changing values call for greater protection of instream flows, and the high costs of developing new supplies for municipal and industrial uses indicate the desirability of transferring water from agriculture to urban areas . Only extreme shortsightedness and a thoughtless scramble to put all their water to use quickly could lead to a future water crisis .
The methods of water allocation used and the development of new uses take place within an institutional framework consisting of interstate compacts, state constitutional and legal provisions, public water agencies, and supervised water markets . This institutional framework that has developed over the past century is now outdated in some important respects that interfere with economically reasonable use of water in the face of changing values and demands. Water rights and other forms of claims to water can be exchanged, but often only within a limited geographical area and at high transactions costs . Institutional reform, perhaps assisted by new information technologies, can greatly improve the effectiveness with which water is used in the Upper Basin . Water marThe Upper Colorado River Basin 171 kets, both intrastate and interstate, can play a much larger role in this process, though there will be conflicts between what individual water owners want to do and what their state is willing to approve .
Water management in the Upper Basin cannot be separated from and use and management . Forest areas constitute the main snowsheds if the Upper Basin, so forest management practices affect water yields, erosion, and water quality . Agricultural practices affect soil erosion and siltation of streams, and saline irrigation return flows resulting from excessive irrigation applications constitute the major water quality problrm of the Upper Basin . Unfortunately, water quantity is administered separately from water quality, with the result that water quality (salinity) improvement programs in the basin are needlessly costly . Again, institutional changes are needed .
The Upper Colorado River Basin has an area of approximately 102,000 square miles, located in southwestern Wyoming, western Colorado, eastern Utah, northwestern New Mexico, and northeastern Arizona . The Upper Basin is sparsely populated, with about 537,000 persons (1980 census), for an average of 5 .3 persons per square mile, compared th a national average density of 57 .4 . The low density is primarily due o the mountainous terrain and the arid to semiarid climate of much of the remainder of the regio Th e 1-IJU t i LIU11 1S expected LO grow at a rate of approximately 1 .4 percent per year (Spofford et al ., 1980, table 4, scenario A, p . 227) , thus rising to about 706,500 in the year 2000 . There are no major cities in the basin ; the main towns are Green River, Wyoming (population 8,000) ; Grand junction (30,000) and Durango, Colorado (12,000) ; and Farmington, New Mexico (22,000) . However, water is exported to the Denver metropolitan area in the east and is likely to be xported to the Salt Lake City area in the future .
The climate ranges from continuous snow cover and heavy precipitation on the western slopes of the Rocky Mountains to desert conditions in the south . Most of the moisture falls as winter snow ; spring and summer rainfall is localized infrequent storm activity . Thus, water suply in the basin is dependent upon construction of dams to capture spring runoff and distribution systems to carry the water to points of use . There is little transfer of water among subbasins of the Upper Basin.
The major economic activities of the basin have traditionally been agriculture, cattle and sheep raising, and the mining of metallic miner- .2 has nearly disappeared with the collapse of the federal synthetic fuels program . It also seems unlikely that food and fiber consumption will increase at all, and it is likely to decrease . Annual exports from he basin to Colorado's Eastern Slope and the Wasatch Front in Utah will probably increase 400,000 acre-feet (Spofford et al ., 1980, (Weatherford and -Jacoby, 1975, fig . 1, p . 186) . The fact that the Upper Basin is not fully consuming the available water does not mean that the water is unused . The river's average flow is fully used, and indeed in a typical year no flow whatsoever reaches the river's original terminus, the Gulf of California .
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As further development takes place in the Upper Basin, some of the current Lower Basin uses of water will have to be foregone . Southern ( ;alifornia is a prime candidate to give up water use, because the state has a legal right to only 4 .4 maf per year although it currently uses 5 .2 inaf per year . These reductions will not be without cost . It has been cal-( iilated that the direct opportunity cost of marginal withdrawals of water from agriculture in southern California ranges from $6 .50 to $30 per acre-foot (Vaux and Howitt, 1984) ; regional income effects might range tip to $200 per acre-foot, depending upon the availability of substitute commodities as inputs into the agricultural and food-processing industi ies and the mobility of resources outside agriculture (Howe and Easter, 1971, updated) . Additional water demands in the Upper Basin could also be met through reductions in current water uses in the Upper Basin itself.
We now know that the virgin flows of the Colorado River have been highly variable . Figure 5 .3 shows Stockton's reconstruction of 400 years of annual runoff measured at Lees Ferry, Arizona . The filtered series in Figure 5 .3 exhibits significant persistence, that is, sequences, of years of positive deviation from the long-term mean (about 13 .5 maf per year) f tllowed by sequences of negative deviations . It is clear from these data that above-average or below-average flow ( .In persist for 10 to 20 years, that is, for significant parts of the intended lifetime of a large . .ater protect . Given the current impossibility of longterm climate prediction, it is difficult to specify any one number as the average flow to use for planning purposes . Rather, attention must be paid to the nature and range of climatological variability likely to be faced and to the flexibility of the system being planned .
Accompanying the growth of water use in the Upper Basin has been a deterioration of water quality in the form of a rising trend of total dissolved solids (TDS) . Current TDS levels at Imperial Dam in the Lower Basin average 850 parts per million, and they are predicted to rise to 1,100 parts per million by the year 2000 in the absence of a more effective salinity control program (Bureau of Reclamation, 1983a) . Current TDS levels are 59 percent attributable to natural point and diffuse sources, 30 percent to agricultural return flows, and 11 percent to municipal-industrial uses and out-of-basin transfers . A major program of salinity reduction is being planned and carried out by the Bureau of Reclamation . The program involves control of several major natural point sources and increased efficiency of water use in the agricultural sector in the Upper Basin . Some agricultural areas are shallowly under- Dracup, 1977, p . 121 . to by salt deposits and are estimated to contribute as much as 10 tons of It per acre per year . Damages from increased salinity concentrations in e Lower Basin are estimated at approximately $493,000 per milligram r liter per year (Gardner, 1983) . It takes approximately 10,000 tons of 1)S in the Upper Basin to raise the concentration at Imperial Dam 1 iItigram per liter per year, but salinity concentrations are also raised by usumptive uses and water exports . Thus, it is clear that further Upper asin development will have significant water quality and quantity fects downstream .
Relationships among land forms, land uses, and water systems iNatural land forms, geological structures, land cover, and patrns of land use affect hydrologic patterns, including runoff, infiltran, wind and water erosion, sedimentation, dissolved solids, and other emical properties of water . Land management measures can be utied to improve hydrologic characteristics of the basin : agricultural actices can reduce erosion and salinity in return flows, forestry praces can affect snowpack and runoff, reseeding and reforestation of nuded areas can increase infiltration and reduce erosion, grazing conols can help maintain a healthy turf and reduce soil compaction, and ntrols over recreational activities can prevent excessive disruption of nd cover . Management programs in the Upper Colorado Basin are acilitated by the fact that roughly 75 percent of the land area is public lid (Upper Colorado Region Group, 1971) . Figure 5 .4 shows the ap-1-oximate patterns of land ownership, administration, and vegetal over, and Table 5 .2 gives estimates of the total runoff, sediment, and Salt : loads from the public lands in Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah . Clearly, land management policies on the public lands are important actors in determining water quality and quantity in the Upper Basin . 
Legal and institutional history of the Colorado Basin
The institutional framework for decision making in the Upper Basin consists of state law and a sequence of compacts and national laws that have evolved over the past 60 years to deal with perceived problems and development opportunities . The key compacts and federal laws, each of which significantly affects the management of Upper Basin water today, are listed and described below . Elaboration on this history is found in Hundley (1986) .
The Colorado River Compact, 1922 (Meyers, 1966 Figure 5 . 1 .) The Colorado River Basin Project Act, 1968 . This act authorized the Centra l Arizona Project (CAP) . long sought by Arizona as a way of transferring water from the Colorado to central Arizona, where groundwater was being overdrawn some 5 maf annually . Although such a project had been studied for decades, the economics was so poor that only a huge federal subsidy could ever pay for the project . Major environmental fights occurred over proposed power dams in Bridge and Marble canyons, revenues from which would presumably (in a bookkeeping sense) help to pay for the CAP . A large thermal power plant was finally included for this purpose .
In addition to authorizing the CAP, this act included the following steps that further defined or constrained development of the river : (1) assigning priority to California's 4 .4 maf, so that Arizona would have to absorb any shortages that might occur from shortfalls of Upper Basin deliveries ; (2) authorizing various Upper Basin projects and Hooker Dam on the Gila ; (3) declaring the Mexican treaty obligation a national obligation to be satisfied (at federal expense) from any future supply augmentation plans ; (4) forbidding any federal studies of importation of water from other river basins (to placate the fears of Columbia River
The Upper Colorado River Basin 181 asin interests) ; (5) authorizing Upper Basin retention of waters not eded to satisfy compact and Mexican obligations to build up reservoir socks sufficient to give reasonable protection to the Upper Basin's estabshed consumptive uses ; and (6) requiring approximate equality in the olumes of water in storage in Lake Powell and Lake Mead (Glen Canon and Hoover dams) . To obtain aid from national programs in competition with other reons, a consensus among basin states was necessary . The potential magtude of federal aid outweighed any gains likely from one state's taking vantage of its neighbor . Federal aid changed a zero-sum game into a sitive-valued game for the Colorado Basin states . Obtaining consensus cant agreement on policies and projects, such as rules for distributing ie river's waters and locating major storage projects . The effectiveness f the policies and projects chosen much depended on the true limatological and hydrologic regimes of the region, about which little as known at the time of many key decisions . Yet, the consensual pross had to continue once it began, even when the scientific data base d desired study results were not at hand . The political costs of failure , ere perceived to be greater than any likely economic or physical ineffiieucies that might result from decisions based on inadequate data .
In spite of the complex legislative history summarized above, no river asin agency has management responsibility for the entire basin . Water as been legally allotted to individual states . This institutional setting has e following effects : (1) states with claims to water in excess of their rrent uses are eager to put this water to use regardless of efficiency nsiderations lest some change of law or adverse . political alignments eprive them of their unused water, (2) it appears doubtful that water n be reallocated among states or between Upper and Lower basins thout substantial changes in existing laws and compacts, and (3) states nd not to be concerned with the downstream quantity and quality fects of their actions .
Hydrology, water use patterns, and the value of water in the subbasins of the Upper Colorado River Basin
The first objective of this section is to characterize the surface hydrology of the eight principal subbasins of the Upper Basin by looking at the average surface outflows and the average net surface outflows, the tter defined as water originating in that subbasin less that subbasin's consumptive use . Each subbasin generates substantial net outflows that, on the average, total 11,145,000 acre-feet per year for the entire upper Basin . If the obligation to the Lower Basin of 7 .5 maf annually and half Mexico's obligation, 0 .75 maf, are subtracted, the result is an average annual Upper Basin surplus of 2,894,000 acre-feet . Of course, these outflows are variable year by year, and this variability and its relation to the risks facing potential users are an important issue .
The second objective of this section is to describe patterns of consumptive water use in the Upper Basin . Because more than 90 percent of all water consumption is in agriculture and 65 percent of agricultural consumption is in the growing of low-value feed grain and forage crops, attention is directed to those low-value agricultural uses, involving an average of 1 .6 maf per year.
A third objective is to estimate the values of this water to the farmer and to the state where the farming operation is located . From a slightly different viewpoint, the farmer's income per acre-foot consumed represents the price at which a farmer is likely to consider selling water . Among the low-valued crops considered, the highest net farm income per acre-foot is $72, with an average of about $25 per acre-foot . However, state income generated directly and indirectly ranges from $75 per acre-foot consumed in Subbasin 1 (Wyoming) to $160 per acre-foot consumed in Basins 5 (Colorado) and 8 (Utah) assuming a permanent shutdown of directly and indirectly linked activities -a worst case sce nario. Thus, the effects of reallocating water from agricultural to nonagricultural uses may be seen quite differently by the individual farmer and the state government .
Further, water has quite significant values when left in the stream . -The purposes served by increasing Upper Basin instream flows include better water quality, recreation, fish and wildlife values beyond their recreational values, hydroelectric generation, and more agricultural production in the Lower Basin . Estimates of these values make it clear that instream values today exceed the income-producing values to the farmer, and in some cases they significantly exceed the total income producing value to the state . These findings have important implications for the desirable and likely patterns of future water use.
Hydrology of the subbasins Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico all lie partly within the Upper Colorado River Basin . The three main subbasins, the Green, the Upper Main Stem of the Colorado, and the San Juan, are divided into smaller subbasins for analytical purposes in this paper . These subbasins are described in The hydrology of each of the eight subbasins can be partially repre : _ sented by the median monthly outflows in acre-feet from the subbasin . (See Table 5 . 4 .) The monthly discharges represent the flow that is met or exceeded 50 percent of the time in the water year . The basin outlet gauging stations for each subbasin are identified in Table 5 . 3 . Computa' Lions are based on all daily values available, and sample sizes range from 18 to 84 years .
In a quantification of the water that might still be available for new uses, it is useful to estimate the amount of water that originates in and flows unused from each of the eight subbasins . This is water that would be available for out-of-basin uses without diminishing existing uses . Sub: basins 1, 2, 4, and 7 are headwater basins that receive no water from other basins . Subbasin 6 is drained primarily by the Dolores River and can thus be considered a headwater basin, although a 30-mile segment of the Colorado main stream runs through the basin in Grand County, Utah . Subbasins 3, 5, and 8 receive water from Basins 1 and 2 ; 4 ; and 3, 5, 6, and 7, 'respectively . These inflows are netted out to compute the net increment to the flow from within the basin . Mean annual net discharges and their standard deviations for the eight subbasins are presented in 'tied to consume . Potential out-of-basin users of these excess waters d surely be interested in the reliability of the supplies : more reliable plies are certainly more valuable and would command a higher price water market . Those who need only supplemental water would not s concerned about the reliability of the flow and would be willing to only a lower price for the water . The reliability of these subbasin net barges can be pictured with a frequency distribution like Agricultural water uses and values Agriculture and agriculturally related activities are the largest sumers of water in the Upper Basin . Livestock production is a domit economic activity in the basin, to which agriculture plays a supportrole . Here the water consumed is quantified by the large-volume, W-value feed and forage crops of the basin . Alfalfa, barley, wheat, oats, grain and silage_ potatoes and pasture represent the v r ---"----`^Y ----F--11L u lc 1.I1cuVlll111411t uses of irrigation water in the basin . The crops are primarily forage and feed for livestock . Irrigated acres by crop are given in Table 5 .6 . Total consumptive uses for each crop in each basin have been computed using Narayanan, Padungchai, and Bishop's (1979) data on consumptive use (acre-feet per acre per year ; see Table 5 What is the value of this water? For the farmer, the value is the net urn to water per acre-foot consumptively used . Consumptive use is the relevant measure because water transfers are generally limited by lie water courts to that volume . Farm budget data (Narayanan et al ., .1979 ), data on consumptive use (Table 5 .7), crop yields per acre for the -eight selected crops (Table 5 .9), crop prices (Table 5 .10), and producon costs ( -Negative returns to barley occur when it is used as a nurse crop for alfalfa .
The cost data include all relevant variable and fixed production costs, including an allowance for family farm labor and the opportunity costs .f management . Thus, the estimated net return per acre of irrigated d for each of the eight crops represents a pure return to water . ))ividing the estimated net return by the amount of water consumptively sed, the average net return per acre-foot of water consumed is derived (Table 5 .12) . Several biases affect this figure . First, some cropping operOons are integrated with cattle operations . The integrated operation Should be budgeted as a unit . Doing so would probably increase some Glues per acre-foot of consumption . Unfortunately, no information on farm structure is available for the region . Second, conservation measres such as reduced water application initially affect yields very little . s conservation steps are increased in intensity, their costs increase .
erefore, our figures overstate the values of initial quantities of water at might be withdrawn from crop irrigation . Further, if water were to partially withdrawn from some of these cropping operations, a raonal response by the farmer would be to change cropping patterns . All . hese steps could be included in a programming approach to derive 4ttore accurate value figures (for example, see Gisser et al ., 1979) . A rogramming approach was not feasible for this study.
In Table 5 .13, consumptive uses in acre-feet are ranked according to he net crop values of Table 5 .12 . Crop 1, crop 2, etc., are different for ch basin . In Subbasin 4, for example, water exhibits its lowest net value -hen used in the cultivation of corn for silage . If farmers in this area , ere offered more than $4 per acre-foot for their water, it is likely that they would stop raising corn for silage, and each year about 5,000 acrefeet of water would be available for other uses . water were to rise to approximately $10 per acre-foot, farmers might he induced to stop producing oats, providing up to an additional 1,624 acre-feet per year for a total of 6,425, etc . This schedule constitutes a crude supply curve for water taken out of existing uses . For the Upper Basin as a whole, combining all eight subbasins, offer prices in excess of $15 per acre-foot would lead to cessation of the production of barley, oats, and potatoes, in the longer term freeing 139,118 acre-feet per year for other uses . An offer price of $25 per acrefoot would be likely to induce farmers to drop the production of wheat, making available a total of 348,671 acre-feet per year . Further, if the offer price for water were higher than $72 per acre-foot, none of the crops presented here would likely be produced in the long run, and 1,566,200 acre-feet per year would be available for other uses .
State income effects of agricultural water use There are sectors in the states' economies that are tied to agriculture either as suppliers (backward linkages) or as processors of agricultural outputs (forward linkages) . In Colorado, for example, the food-
Ocessing sector is one of the largest sectors in the state owing primarily the processing of meat provided by the livestock sector, which in turn largely fed by outputs of irrigated agriculture (Gray and McKean, 75) . Taking crops out of production may affect these sectors to some tent. To what extent would the withdrawal of irrigation water in the pper Basin affect the various state economies? State governments and e state water agencies can be expected to consider the overall effect on "ate income and employment, not simply the direct loss of income to the ariner, even though from a national accounting stance, these secondary come impacts may largely cancel out, with gains to other areas .
What are the determinants of the extent to which state income losses light exceed the direct loss of farm income? The following factors ortld be important :
• The extent to which the agricultural crops being phased out have been exported without further value added or the extent to which they have been used as inputs into other state sectors, for example, livestock ; • The extent to which substitute agricultural inputs are available through imports to sustain the agriculturally linked activities ; • Whether the water released from agriculture substitutes for costly new supply projects to service continuing state growth ; and • Whether the money from the sale of agricultural water is reinvested within the state .
f one can answer "to a large extent" to the first two items and "yes" to e remaining two, then one would expect few income losses beyond the ss of direct farm income . If the answers are "to a very small extent" and o," one would expect fairly severe income losses beyond the farm level . n Colorado, 92 percent of irrigated agriculture's output is used in the yestock sector, food processing, and consumption or export (Gray and cKean, 1975) . The crops in western Colorado that would be phased lit are primarily feed grains and forage crops, so the relevant linkage is the livestock sector, because the rest is exported . The livestock sector, turn, is linked to food processing . Regarding substitutes, it seems inlikely that no agricultural substitutes would be available from in-state f)r out-of-state sources . It is assumed here that half the reduction in gricultural outputs could be substituted from such sources . Western Colorado has a surfeit of water overall (although some lotalities experience shortages), but eastern Colorado will provide a ready market for agricultural water from the Colorado Basin through sequences of exchanges, if not by direct transmission . It seems likely that .waters withdrawn from agriculture are likely to substitute for expensive The methodology for estimating these direct and indirect income losses is complicated by the absence of appropriate models . As water is progressively withdrawn from agriculture, farmers substitute other inputs (labor, capital) for water, and they adjust their cropping patterns and their total acreage. These adjustments result in a nonlinear response of farm income to water withdrawal . A detailed programming model is needed to approximate the kinds of decisions that would be made by a profit-maximizing farmer .
The models that are available are state input-output (1-0) models for Colorado and Utah. (None is available for Wyoming .) 1-0 models are fixed coefficient models that imply no substitution possibilities . However, they do present the historical interrelationships among the sectors of the state economy . If used with good judgment and an acquaintance with the workings of the state economy, the 1-0 models can provide reasonable approximations of statewide effects .
The sequence of steps in the analysis is as follows : (1) a reduction in irrigated output is postulated, (2) the reduction is divided into reductions in deliveries to final demand (consumption or export) and reductions in inputs into the livestock sector, (3) reductions in livestock output are calculated and treated as reductions in inputs into the food-processing sector, (4) all reductions in food-processing output are treated as reductions in deliveries to final demand, and (5) all reductions in delivThe Upper Colorado River Basin 193 -cries to final demand are "run through" the 1-0 model to obtain the total reduction in payments to households, insurance, real estate, rent, intere t, and profits . The average result for Colorado and Utah is that a $1 reduction in irrigated agricultural output leads to a $1 .80 reduction in state incomes . The results are given in Table 5 .14 . These state income losses should be compared with the direct on-farm income losses shown in Table 5 . 13 . The higher state income losses are likely to lead to state resistance to private out-of-state water sales .
The value of water in instream uses
Values of water consumed in agriculture to the farmer and to t ie state economy have been estimated . Naturally, some of this water will be bid away from agriculture for other uses, either inside or outside the t pper Basin itself. However, the water would generate quite substantial values if left in the stream : in hydroelectric power generation, in recreation, in maintaining higher water quality, and in downstream consumption . In many cases, these values far exceed the value to the farmer, and in some cases they exceed state income losses that would follow from withdrawing the water from agriculture .
The doctrine of beneficial use in western water law generally does not allow the appropriation of water rights for instream uses of water . Howver, hydroelectric power generation is treated as a nonconsumptive iversion use for which water can be appropriated . Federal installations have not filed for such flow rights . The value of water in hydroelectric production is the value of the marginal electric power produced by an acre-foot of water. Reservoir releases are generally managed so that most of the water passing through the reservoir is used in hydroelectric production .
The Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP) provides for developing he Upper Basin's compact-apportioned waters while still meeting its flow obligations at Lees Ferry, Arizona . Four storage units, Flaming Gorge, Wayne Aspinall (formerly Curecanti, consisting of Blue Mesa, Morrow Point, and Crystal), Glen Canyon, and Navajo, were authorized to provide long-term regulatory storage . The reservoirs created by the (RSP have a combined storage capacity of 34 maf (Water and Power esources Service, 1981, p. 355) . All but one of the units, Navajo, create hydroelectric power. The power-producing units are located in Sub-)asins 1, 4, and 8 . A complex transmission system has been provided for the electricity created by the CRSP . Data on the energy generated and the revenues from sale to electric utilities were obtained from the Bureau of Reclamation's Annual Report (1981, app . III (Gardner, 1985) . New thermal power-generating and distribution costs are around 8 .5 cents per kilowatt hour (Hamilton and Lyman, 1983 Water that is released from Lake Powell proceeds downstream to Lake Mead in back of Hoover Dam . Enroute and during storage in Lake Mead, water is lost by evaporation and seepage, so an acre-foot released is roughly equal to 0 .9 acre-feet available for release from Hoover Dam . Historically, Hoover Dam has generated about 290 kilowatt hours per acre-foot of water released (Bureau of Reclamation, 1981) . Thus, the value of an acre-foot released upstream, allowed to enter LakeMead and then released, would be 290 x 0.0 106 x 0 .9 = $2 .76 if priced at 10 .6 mills, or $11 .48 valued at avoided cost . Table 5 .15 summarizes the hydroelectric values calculated above as they relate to water released in rich subbasin .
In addition to the hydropower values of water left in or released to the stream, recreation values can be enhanced for both stream-related and reservoir-based recreation . For stream-related recreation, the stabilization of flow at levels that enhance aesthetics and fish life is important, but both extremely high and low flows are detrimental . These figures show that, under some conditions, higher streamflows are highly valued for recreation, but these values depend on timing. For example, an increase above 200 cubic feet per second (cfs) during the late summer would be valued at $23 per cfs per day . Because 1 cfs maintained over a day totals 2 acre-feet, a release of 2 acre-feet per day would generate recreation values of $11 .47 per acre-foot. On the other hand, added releases during spring high flows would reduce recreational values . Thus, such values are quite specific to certain river reaches, and little can be said about such values in the absence of specialized studies .
Reservoir recreation is also valuable . Howe et al . (1982) estimated the worth of reservoir recreation along the Denver-Fort Collins corridor at $18 .75 per person per day . Values at a unique site such as Lake Powell may well be even higher in spite of the lake's remote location . Again, such values are highly site specific . However, the issue for this study is the marginal effect of added streamflow . In dry years, increased flows would reduce reservoir drawdown, adding to recreational values, but in wet years, the water would simply be passed through the reservoir . On
The Upper Colorado River Basin 197 e average, however, the additional water would have some value, but o specific studies are available for the Upper Basin . The other quite important instream value stems from the increases in water quality that would result from reductions in Upper Basin consumptive uses . As explained in detail in the following section on water uality issues, the removal of high-quality (low total dissolved solids) water in the Upper Basin increases the TDS concentration downstream n two ways : the removal of low TDS water reduces the dilution factor for the lower-quality waters downstream, and the return flows from the water, if any, may be high in TDS, thus increasing the overall TDS concentration .
The average salinity of the river at its source is 50 milligrams (mg) per liter ; at Imperial Dam, the last major diversion point before it reaches Mexico, it is more than 800 mg per liter . The Bureau of Reclamation estimates that 59 percent of the salinity concentration at Hoover Dam emanates from natural sources (saline springs, erosion of sediments, and the concentrating effects of evaporation and transpiration), and 41 percent comes from man-made causes (irrigation applications, municipalities and industry, and out-of-basin transfers) (Bureau of Reclamation, 1983a) . Of the man-made sources of salinity, roughly 72 percent (or 30 percent of the total) can be attributed to the extensive irrigated agriculture within the basin .
Most of the damages attributable to high salinity concentrations are h orne by the water users in the Lower Colorado River basin . The extremely high salt load of 9 million tons annually entering Lake Mead adversely affects more than 12 million people and about 1 million acres of irrigated farmland (Bureau of Reclamation, 1983a In addition to the instream values mentioned above, there is the opportunity cost of the water to downstream users in the Lower Basin . Vaux and Howitt (1984) estimated these costs as in the $8-$30 per acrefoot range ; Howe and Young (1978) estimated a $30 value . The sum of all these foregone values is shown by subbasin in Table 5 .17 . Thus, it seems clear that the values generated by leaving water in the stream considerably exceed many of the values generated on-farm in agriculture . (See Table 5 . 13 .) Water quality issues in the Colorado Basin
The previous section discussed costs to the Lower Basin caused by increased salinity concentrations . Consumptive uses, evaporation, and exports in the Upper Basin cause these increased TDS levels . Thus, Upper Basin uses cannot be fully evaluated without quantifying the consequent water quality impacts .
An ideal river basin management scheme would simultaneously opti-
The Upper Colorado River Basin 199 ntize both the allocation of water quantities and the control of water quality . A property right in water is not fully specified unless the dimensions of water quality are specified . Howe, Shurmeier, and Shaw (1986) have shown that economically efficient water allocation can be achieved only by joint quantity-quality optimization . In this practice, this jointness has been finessed by specifying ambient water quality standards . A water ight is then defined in terms of quantities that are better than or equal to the standard quality .
In the absence of laws and agencies that might provide joint optimization of water quantities and quality, it is important that the quality stanc ards be reached at minimum cost . This section identifies the various steps that can be taken to improve water quality, estimates their costs, and arranges them in increasing order of cost .
The Environmental Protection Agency (1971) erage of 4 maf per year, the quality of which was near that of the water used in California and Arizona . However, Glen Canyon Dam was completed in 1961, and the need for storage in Lake Powell caused the flows o Mexico to fall to the compact limit . At the same time, the WelltonMohawk Irrigation Project came into operation, discharging large volumes of brine into the river . The saline concentration of the water delivered to Mexico rose to approximately 1,500 mg per liter, causing extensive damage to irrigated agriculture in the Mexicali Valley (Oyarzabal-Tamargo and Young, 1978) .
With passage of the Colorado River Storage Project Act in 1956, the Secretary of the Interior was directed by Congress to study the quality of the Colorado River and its tributaries and to investigate possible means by which the quality of water could be improved . Department of the Interior, 1985, p . 63) . While the Bureau of Reclamation has been establishing large capitalintensive projects, the Department of Agriculture (USDA) has been experimenting with various on-farm measures for reducing the salt load of the river. The USDA Salinity Laboratory is experimenting with the use of saline water in irrigating certain salt-tolerant crops ; the Soil Conservation Service has been evaluating automated irrigation systems in Colorado .
The USDA's beneficial saline strategy involves intercepting irrigation drainage return flows before they are mixed with the river (Bureau of Reclamation, 1984) . This saline water in turn is used for irrigation at certain periods during the irrigation season of some crops . When the drainage water is no longer useful for irrigation, the water is discharged to evaporation ponds . This strategy is intended to reduce diversions and the salt loading of the river by irrigating salt-sensitive crops (lettuce, alfalfa, corn, etc .) in rotation with river water, while salt-tolerant crops (wheat, cotton, sugar beets, barley, oats, etc .) are irrigated with drainage ,water . The switch to drainage water would occur after seedling establish-,pent, and preplant and initial irrigations would be done with river water. Long-term feasibility has not yet been established .
There is growing evidence that light, frequent irrigations are beneficial to plant growth and that they reduce the salt load entering the river (Bureau of Reclamation, 1982) . With a "cablegation" automated irrigation system, soil water contents generally do not reach the extreme lows arid highs of typical flood irrigation . Through avoidance of the lows, ,water stress and associated crop yield reductions are lessened . Eliminating extremely high soil water avoids deep percolation, thereby reducing the return of saline water to the river .
A major project of the Salinity Control Program is the Paradox Valley Project . The Paradox Valley is a collapsed salt anticline in west central Colortdo along the Dolores River . Numerous brine seeps enter the river along 1 .2-mile stretch . With an average concentration of 260,000 mg per liter, the brine contributes about 205,000 tons of salt to the river system each year (Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum, 1984) . The salinity control proposal calls for lowering the freshwater-brine interface below the river channel by groundwater pumping, injecting the brackish water into deep wells within the valley . The project is to remove 180,000 tons of salt annually from the river system at a cost of $11-$28 per ton, or $107,000-$266,000 per mg per liter (Bureau of Reclamation, 1983b) .
Another major project involves Las Vegas Wash in Nevada, a natural drainage channel, the lower reach of which is now a perennial stream owing to sewage discharges from the Las Vegas metropolitan area and other wastewaters . Nearly 230,000 tons of salt were discharged in 1982 (Bureau of Reclamation, 1982) . The high salt load is caused by the disposal of wastewater and the consequent leaching of salt from the underlying saline deposits . Reducing groundwater flow has been proposed to reduce salinity . The Las Vegas Wash Unit is to remove 71,000 tons of salt from the river system at an annual cost of $10 .30-$11 .50 per ton, or $102,000-$114,000 per mg per liter (Bureau of Reclamation, 1983b) .
Economic analysis of salinity control alternatives indicates that salinity control should be undertaken to the point at which the marginal benefits of salinity reduction (that is, damages avoided) equal the marginal cost of control. We have seen (Gardner, 1983 ) that these damages approximate $492,969 per mg per liter in the 875-1,100 mg per liter range . Both the Paradox Valley and Las Vegas Wash Units appear to be cost-effective means for salinity control because benefits appear to exceed costs per ton of salt removed . For the Grand Valley Unit, however, costs of abatement are greater than the damages avoided . The other CRWQIP projects authorized by Congress (LaVerkin Springs, Lower Gunnison Basin, Unita Basin, McElmo Creek Basin, Glenwood-Dotsero Springs, and Big Sandy, River) have benefit-cost ratios of less than one (Gardner, 1983, p . 187) . A summary of Bureau of Reclamation and Department of Agriculture salinity projects is given in Table 5 . 18 and Figures 5 .6 and 5 .7 . In addition to the poor cost-effectiveness of most of the projects, annual salt removal is significantly below what is needed to ensure meeting the criteria in 2005 . The Bureau of Reclamation, in cooperation with private firms, is therefore looking at new ways of either disposing of or putting to beneficial use saline and brackish water . The most promising prospects for wastewater use at this point are in energy development, slurry lines, and disposal in dry lakes (for example, Sevier Dry Lake and dry lakes in the desert of southeastern California) . Roughly 610,000 acre-feet per year of saline water containing 2 .6 million tons of salt could be collected for disposal or use in energy development and in slurry lines (Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum, 1984, p . 40 ) . Desalination or evaporation of the saline waters could cost $4-8 billion . The same degree of salinity control through beneficial consumptive use of saline waters may cost much less (Bureau of Reclamation, 1983a) . One possibility is the use of highly saline wastewater in power plant cooling . With minimal pretreatment, water from 2,100 to 4,000 mg per liter TDS can be used in some cooling processes (Water and Power Resources Service, 1980, p . 3) . California, Wyoming, and Utah are active in this pursuit. The Big Sandy River rises in the Wind River Mountains of southwestern Wyoming, and the water is of good quality . By the time irrigation return flows from the Eden project are mixed with the river, 19,565 acre-feet of highly saline water (1,000-6,000 mg per liter) and 164,000 tons of salt are discharged into the Green River (U.S . Department of the Interior, 1985) . The Bureau of Reclamation has recommended piping saline water to the Jim Bridger Power Plant for use in power plant cooling (Bureau of Reclamation, 1985a) .
In May 1985, the Bureau of Reclamation issued its final report on using Big Sandy River Unit water at the Jim Bridger Power Plant. One option would remove 50,250 tons of salt from the river per year at a cost of roughly $70 per ton (Bureau of Reclamation, 1985a, tables ES-4 and ES-5). This option would reduce the salinity concentration at Imperial Dam 4 .57 mg per liter at an annual cost of $70,000 per mg per liter . The most cost-effective process option would remove 25,125 tons of salt per year at an annual cost of $45 per ton, for reduced salinity concentrations at Imperial Dam of 2 .54 mg per liter at an annual cost of $450,000 per nig per liter . Thus, the latter option may be economically marginal . The Bureau of Reclamation has studied available technology for saline water use at Hunter Powerplant in Utah . Findings indicate that the binary cooling tower is not cost effective compared to other saline water use equipment and that other processes involving off-the-shelf hardware are efficient in using saline water in cooling applications (Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Forum, 1984) .
Although interest in using saline water for cooling is widespread, the process is acceptable only for new generating capacity . The use of highly saline water in other forms of energy development (oil shale, tar sands, coal gasification, etc .) holds promise if those resources are ever developed .
The use of saline water in slurry pipelines for transporting coal, potash, trona, and other marketable minerals from western fields to market areas is under consideration in a number of instances . The most amhitious program is the Aquatrain program . All the aforementioned uses of saline wastewater would be tied together by a pipeline carrying highly saline water to points of beneficial consumptive use in the western states . In its original form, the project envisioned a saline water pipeline carrying plastic capsules of clean, dry coal to the West Coast . In 1983, this proposal was dropped in favor of a double-barrel pipeline, one carrying saline water and the other carrying a liquid carbon dioxide and coal slurry . A report completed in 1984 identified various input and output points (that is, coal mines, carbon dioxide, saline water sources, power plants, and export sites) in southwestern Wyoming, western Colorado, Utah, northern Arizona, central and southern Nevada, and southern California . Probable uses of the saline water include power plant cooling, oil shale development, solution mining, tar sand development, and hydraulic mining . If all potential sources of saline water are used, 160,000 acre-feet per year of water could be transported to users and 900,000 tons of salt could be removed annually (Bureau of Reclamation, 1985b, p . 88) . The Bureau of Reclamation will attempt to determine the potential benefits and costs of the project . The disposal alternative (transporting water to dry lake beds and evaporating the water) for removing highly saline water from the river system is probably the least viable . It will most likely involve an interbasin transfer of water because the proposed dry lake beds lie in areas outside the basin of origin . Consequently, a plethora of legal and institutional constraints are brought into the picture . The Bureau of Reclamation proposed to Wyoming the piping of saline water into the Great Divide Basin, and the state rejected the proposal . Colorado law, in addition to requiring compensatory storage for the basin of origin in transbasin diversions, does not recognize evaporation as beneficial use of water .
Regulation of the Colorado's natural flow has significantly altered the seasonal and annual variations in flow and salinity concentrations . Between 1963 and 1980, massive The alternative approaches discussed above include both large capital-intensive projects and some on-farm measures by the Soil Conservation Service (USDA) . The latter involve installing gated pipe and other improved mechanical systems for improving irrigation efficiency . In addition, Young and Leathers (1978) have studied other on-farm options that primarily involve more careful management of irrigation water application and modified cropping patterns . Howe and Young (1978) and Howe and Orr (1974) studied the savings in consumptive use of water and salt in the return flow that would be involved in phasing out marginal agricultural lands in the Grand and Uncompaghre Valleys of Colorado . The former study considered a phase-out of 8,800 acres in the Grand Valley and 10,200 in the Uncompaghre, calculating the direct and indirect losses that might ensue . Income losses were about $16 .30 per ton of salt reduction, but for every ton of salt reduction, 0 .17 acre-feet of consumptive use was also avoided . Valuing this water saved at the hydroelectric opportunity cost of $31 .36 per acre-foot (Table 5 .16) plus the direct Lower Basin agriculture opportunity cost of $30 per acre-foot, the net cost is reduced to about $6 .50 per ton from the viewpoint of the entire Colorado Basin .
Taking into account both the salt reductions and changed consumptivve uses (positive and negative), the net costs per ton of salt reduced are c0mpared in Table 5 . 19 . The activities have been ranked by net cost per ton of salt reduction from a basinwide viewpoint . It is clear that on-farm management and irrigation system changes and irrigated acreage constitute the most cost-effective approaches to salinity reduction . The larger projects are substantially more costly .
The problem is to motivate use of the low-cost alternatives . The ontarm measures of Young and Leathers (1978) would be paid for by the farmer, and all the federal programs are likely to be paid for by the federal government . Acreage retirements could be made attractive to farmers by having the state government or a federal agency offer to buy either the land or the irrigation water . Given the low direct income per acre (or per acre-foot), the offering price would not have to be high . Table 5 . 17 .) The potential for intrastate and interstate water markets involving the Upper Basin
The recent literature on privatization of resources emphasizes the likely advantages of private ownership and market exchange over The Upper Colorado River Basin 209 bureaucratic control and allocation . Stroup and Baden (1983) emphasized the rigidities of nontransferable public rights in resources and the inefficiencies of bureaucratic resource management in energy, groundwater, and timber . Anderson (1983a Anderson ( , 1983b has analyzed the transition of western water rights from early (mining) appropriations doctrine to a wore restrained system based on the common law concept of beneficial use . The thrust of these arguments is a return to the market, away from centralized, bureaucratic control .
It has always been recognized, however, that the establishment of markets is severely inhibited and the outcome likely to be inefficient in the presence of pervasive externalities that result either from the user's consumption of the resource (for example, water pollution) or directly from the buyer-to-seller transaction (for example, through changes in return flows) . Water resources are a case in point, in which the sale of water nearly always has positive and/or negative direct impacts on third parties . Yet, fairly extensive markets have developed for water . These .markets, although sometimes involving rather high transactions costs, have been successful in transferring water from lower-to higher-valued uses over time in many locations of the West .
This section identifies characteristics that would be generally desirable for resource allocation mechanisms and argues that, for water, markets ssess more of these characteristics than their alternatives . Some shortcomings of water markets are also described .
Desirable characteristics of resource allocation mechanisms and their implications for markets
Increased flexibility in the allocation of existing water supplies is vital, so that water can be shifted from use to use and place to place as climatic, demographic, and economic conditions change over time . Both short-and long-term flexibility is needed . Within a given season, rainfall and temperature conditions frequently vary from expected values, opening up possibilities for beneficial water exchanges among agrictiltural users and between the agricultural sector and municipalities. In the longer term, regional population patterns and economic structures change, increasing the relative marginal value of water in some uses and decreasing it in others .
A second desirable characteristic is security of tenure for established Users . Only if the water user can be assured of continued use will the user invest in and maintain water-using systems . Security of tenure need not be inconsistent with flexibility as long as users can voluntarily respond to incentives for reallocating water (the third characteristic) . Fourth, it is important that water allocation mechanisms confront the user with the real opportunity cost of the water being used . Only then will the economically efficient technology of water use be chosen . Naturally, pursuit of this goal must be subject to constraints imposed by other social goals -for example, equity and environmental protection .
Fifth, a water allocation process should be perceived by the public as equitable and fair . Water users should not impose uncompensated costs on other parties, and parties giving up water should be compensated, as should those injured by changes in points of diversion or return flows . This goal, plus the security characteristics mentioned above, again imply that most changes in water allocation should be noncompulsory .
Sixth, a socially responsible water allocation process must reflect public values that may not be adequately considered by individual water users . For example, water quality and instream flow maintenance may generate large public values but may be of little concern to individual water users.
Seventh, it is desirable that the outcome of the allocation process be predictable in particular applications . If a buyer and seller identify a particular transaction, it is desirable that they be able to predict how much water they can transfer . Applications to a water control board may be subject to adjustments by the state engineer or the water court to protect third parties . All allocation mechanisms will incorporate some degree of hydrologic uncertainty .
The characteristics mentioned above are found to a large degree in market processes for the allocation of scarce resources . First, of course, for a market to exist and function well, there must be well-defined property rights in the resource being allocated . Such definition is particularly difficult in the case of water . Property rights and the existence of markets guarantee flexibility in response to changing values . They also guarantee security of tenure in that no one has to sell water unless it is advantageous to do so. Market prices will confront potential users with the appropriate opportunity costs if the geographical extent of the market incorporates all physical impacts of water transactions . Fair compensation is guaranteed between buyers and sellers in a market almost by definition, because transactions are voluntary and payment does take place (in contrast to the Hicks-Kaldor criterion, in which beneficiaries must be able only to compensate the losers) . Various public values could be reflected in market-determined allocation if units of local government and/or consortia of private interests could buy and sell in the market to protect instream flows and water quality (this practice is certainly not widespread) . If such purposes are not possible, the market environment can sometimes be appropriately conditioned through
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Thus, the market is not a perfect mechanism, but it fares well compared with other arrangements on most of the criteria above .
Water market failures and their mitigation
The main problem is the imposition of externalities on parties other than the buyer and seller . Such third-party effects take the form of changed return flows that are being used by others, groundwater level changes, and water quality changes . The return flow problem was first discussed by Hartman and Seastone (1970) , and water quality externalities have been extensively discussed in the water quality literature . When third-party effects result from market transactions, there is no guarantee that the transactions will result in an overall increase in net benefits unless the third-party effects can be clearly quantified and are required to be compensated .
However, in determining the comparative desirability of markets versus other allocative mechanisms, the relevant comparison is not between markets that can function without externalities and water markets with their inherent third-party problems ; rather, it is between water markets and other rational allocative mechanisms . All rational mechanisms would require the determination of third-party effects and their consideration in the allocation process . In this regard, the costs associated with markets are no greater than the costs of other rational mechanisms .
A second problem in many water market settings is that of adequate communication among potential buyers and sellers . Although large water conservancy districts with professional staffs may be able to communicate desires to buy or sell easily and cheaply, individual farmers or small towns often have a hard time finding buyers or sellers, or even knowing where to look . Matching buyers and sellers across greater distances would be more difficult .
A third problem is the maintenance of instream flows and adequate water quality . Motivation for provision of adequate instream flow and adequate water quality is lacking because of the public-good nature of their benefits (beauty of the river, sports fishing, wildlife maintenance, etc .) and because market boundaries do not extend as far as reduced flow, increased salinity, and other physical effects .
We have seen clearly in Table 5 .16 that large instream power and water quality values, plus the opportunity cost of water in Lower Basin applications, are not reflected in current market prices for water because present water markets are limited to state boundaries . In addition, the limitations placed on instream uses as beneficial uses make it difficult to protect those values . Howe and Lee (1983) have argued that the best way to protect instream values within a state is to permit units of local government to acquire water rights and to hold them for purposes of instream flow maintenance .
A fourth problem is the asymmetric treatment of return flows in a market context . Although third parties are protected from damage (or are guaranteed adequate compensation) resulting from reduced return flows, third parties that gain from increased return flows are not made to pay for these benefits . Consequently, the costs to some third parties (or the costs of protecting those third parties) are reflected in markets, but the benefits to others are not . And some transactions that should take place do not . Third-party effects must be taken into account, and, from an equity viewpoint, compensation should be paid to losing third parties so that no one is worse off as a result of the transaction . The main issue in making markets work more efficiently is to identify and quantify these effects accurately and quickly and to reach agreement on their magnitudes so that compensation or adjustment to the original property rights can be made without excessive transactions costs .
In the United States, systems of state water law provide safeguards for potentially damaged third parties . Prospective transactions must be advertised, and parties that perceive themselves to be damaged have recourse to administrative actions or court hearings that will result either in compensation for damages from the buyer or in modification of the water right being transferred (for example, the amount and timing of permitted diversions) . In New Mexico, the state engineer's office identifies third-party effects and also proposes modifications to the right being transferred (for example, the amount and timing of permitted diversions) that should make the transfer acceptable to all parties . The buyer has the option of paying compensation to damaged third parties to effect their agreement to the transfer (see Hartman and Seastone, 1970, chap . 3) . In Colorado, proposed transfers of water rights are advertised, and third parties are allowed to register their objections with the district water court . The buyer can then either negotiate with these parties to get their consent, agree to a court hearing on the transfer, or drop the transfer . In many cases, negotiation over compensation to third parties is successful (see Howe, Alexander, and Moses, 1982) .
The court trial process is costly and time consuming, and it fails to produce the best analysis of the case . Because the process is adversarial, each party brings its own experts, who have strong motivation to bias their analyses in favor of their clients . The court must select a comproThe Upper Colorado River Basin 213 raise position, so the outcome of a case is hard to predict . In one case, the city of Boulder was permitted to divert 18 percent of the entitlement of a ditch company share that the city purchased and was also restricted to diverting water at the same times as the ditch company . When buyer, seller, and third parties cannot agree, court modification of rights to prevent third-party damages can result in a large reduction in benefits to buyer and seller in order to avoid only small losses to third parties.
Communications problems between potential buyers and sellers may require a state agency to help make a market by establishing procedures for the publication of desire to buy or sell . Although such services could )e provided by private brokers, the market may be too thin to support in institution that does not already exist for other purposes .
Instream flow values can be reflected in the purchase and holding of water rights by units of government or consortia of private interests that ,ire concerned about the maintenance of these values . The obstacles, however, are legal and institutional . State laws frequently do not recognize instream uses as beneficial uses . In Colorado, state law permits the state government to file or buy water rights and to devote that water to instream flow maintenance, although lower levels of government and private parties are not allowed to do so . Institutionally, it may be costly to organize the large number of individuals, each of whom has a small interest in these values . However, in a dynamic setting where town, county, and state governments could buy water rights on behalf of their citizens, these problems would not be as severe as implied in the literature (Howe and Lee, 1983) .
To date, under appropriations doctrine, water sales have been confined within a state because state law governs such transactions . Under state appropriations doctrine, river basins may sell water to each other, subject only to existing or compact conditions . Most sales, however, take place on the same river . Water conservancy districts (WCDs) are typically established to contract with state and federal governments for raw water from large projects. In most cases, district constitutions permit transfers among users, but in many cases transfers of such state and federally provided water outside the district are not permitted . Because localized markets within WCDs and small river basins have been active for many years in the western United States, some of the largest opportunities for increased efficiency lie in interdistrict markets .
Many WCDs persist in following inefficient allocation methods . Thus, it is worthwhile to describe and evaluate any market arrangements that appear to be working efficiently . One that could well be adopted by other WCDs is that found in the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District (NCWCD) . The federal Colorado-Big Thompson Project was begun in 1937 and completed in 1957 to bring supplemental irrigation water from the western side of the Rocky Mountains to northeastern Colorado . The NCWCD was established to contract with the federal government for purchase of the water, repayment of project costs, and distribution of the water to final users (see Howe, Schurmeier, and Shaw, 1982 ; Maass and Anderson, 1978) . The Colorado-Big Thompson Project has provided a historical average of 230,000 acre-feet, or about 17 percent of the total water supply of the region . Although this supply is primarily for supplemental irrigation, towns and a growing number of industries use the project as a raw water supply .
The NCWCD was established in 1937 to contract with the Bureau of Reclamation for Colorado-Big Thompson water and to devise methods for allocating the water available to it among potential users . The NCWCD includes areas of quite different natural water supplies in relation to the amount of arable land . As a result, potential users did not want a mandatory uniform assignment of water to the land . These sentiments finally led, in 1957, to a clear-cut definition of an NCWCD share (allotment) as a freely transferable contract between the district and the holder. Each share entitles the holder to 1/310,000 of the water availableapproximately 0 .7 acre-feet of water per year . The transferability of the allotments stimulated creation of a market in which they could be traded .
Much of the water needed for urban and nonagricultural industrial growth is provided by the sale of NCWCD allotments from agriculture . These nonagricultural users often "rent" excess water to irrigation on a short-term (annual) basis . In the early years, many irrigators gave away their allotments because they did not want to pay the $1 .50 annual charge. Allotment prices increased from $30 in 1960 to $291 in 1973 . This trend accelerated sharply in 1974, with average prices reaching a peak of $2,161 in 1980 . Since 1980, prices have fallen to about $900 because of the completion of a new transmountain water supply project that will supply water to some towns in the region .
Rentals are transfers of water among users for one season only without transfer of the allotment titles . The NCWCD office facilitates communication among prospective buyers and sellers, so that rentals are easily effected in response to relatively small discrepancies in water values among users. About 30 percent of the Colorado-Big Thompson water is involved in rental transactions each year ; towns are the main renters of water to agriculture .
Third-party and instream flow problems have not been solved in the NCWCD . The complexities and high transactions costs imposed on most water transfers by possible third-party intervention have been circumThe Upper Colorado River Basin 215
vented because the district has retained title to all return flows . This practice is permitted under Colorado law for waters newly imported to a basin . Third-party effects still do occur, leaving open the possibility that some sales are economically inefficient . Regarding instream flows, Greenly, Walsh, and Young (1982) believe that improved water quality in the South Platte River and its tributaries would be valued highly by Iecreationists, residents, and citizens expressing strong option values . Their estimates indicate a high value for instream flows in the NCWCD, but no specific arrangements have been made to guarantee such flows . Although the NCWCD market arrangements have shortcomings from an efficiency viewpoint, they appear to be much more efficient than alternative water distribution mechanisms . Transaction costs are much lower than with the transfer of water rights under state laws . Flexibility is infinitely greater than under many Bureau of Reclamation contracts that prohibit water transfers from specific land parcels . Security of tenure is greater than that found under administrative procedures, such as those in the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District, where water is reallocated annually by the board of directors (see Hartman and Seastone, 1970, chap . 6 ) . The possibility off easily and advantageously replicating these NCWCD market structures in other project areas warrants serious consideration .
The potential for interstate water markets
The major device for allocating the waters of interstate rivers among the riparian states has been the congressionally approved interstate compact . Major examples are the Delaware and Potomac compacts in the eastern United States and the Yellowstone, Colorado, Rio Grande, and Columbia (international) compacts in the West . They were negotiated among the riparian states (and with Mexico) and approved by Congress . Any revisions would require unanimous agreement among the signatories .
Another device for allocating interstate streams is litigation between states under the doctrine of equitable apportionment. In suits between states, the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction . The doctrine is quite complex and is sharply tailored to individual situations, generally following neither appropriations nor riparian doctrine .
Western states continue to express concern that water allocated to them by interstate compact may, in fact, be effectively taken away by other states through nonuse . There appears to be no legal basis for such loss, but political leaders apparently fear that "use it or lose it" will somehow apply between states as it does within states, perhaps through political alliances against financing upstream water projects . Some ero-sion of the ability to effect the utilization of compact-granted water has occurred because of salinity control programs and the Endangered Species Act . As a result of these fears, political pressures have risen for the construction of new water projects to tie down this water . Some projects proposed largely for this purpose (for example, the Animas-La Plata Project in Colorado) are grossly inefficient from an economic viewpoint and would certainly tie the water to uses of little value in the long run, rather than protecting it for important future developments .
It is clear that the status of potential interstate water sales by either private appropriators or public bodies is in a state of legal flux . Although it seems clear from Sporhase v . Nebraska and City of El Paso v . Reynolds that blanket prohibitions of interstate transfers are unconstitutional, necessary conditions for legal sales have not become clear . An interesting recent proposal is that of the Galloway Group, Ltd ., a Colorado corporation that wants to sell surface water apportioned to the state of Colorado but purportedly claimed under Colorado water rights by entities in Arizona and Southern California . (For an excellent analysis, see Gross, 1985 .) Galloway claims to have water rights to 1 .3 maf of water per year on the Yampa and White rivers in western Colorado, in the Upper Colorado Basin . Galloway intends to raise more than $200 million of private capital to build dams on the two rivers to generate electric power and store water .
In August 1984, the San Diego Water Authority paid Galloway $10,000 for an option to lease 300,000-500,000 acre-feet for 40 years . Many questions remain unanswered . Gross (1985) has concluded that the Colorado River Compact and the Upper Colorado River Compact preclude the Galloway proposal, mainly through implied territorial use limitations . Gross further concludes that the compacts, as federal law, are immune from Commerce Clause attack .
On the economic side, there are questions of the price it would be reasonable for San Diego to pay, given the alternatives, and the effects that a clearing of legal barriers would have on the total supply coming from the Upper Basin . At a time when the western power market is overbuilt, when Colorado has excess storage capacity in existing Western Slope reservoirs, and when the Colorado Basin's total storage is so large that total basin yields fall with added storage, it seems to make little sense from the financial and economic viewpoints to make such large investments in storage . If the proposal is someday permitted, it should be without the waste of added storage .
The answers to many questions are yet unknown . Must the water be confined to a pipeline? Is it sufficient that it be made part of a larger product (chicken soup or coal slurry)? Can water sold be allowed to The Upper Colorado River Basin 217 remain in the stream to be abstracted downstream by the buyer? Can a state government lease part of the water allocated to it under interstate compact but not currently used (for example, waters unappropriated under state water law or held by the state for state uses)? Would interstate water leases or sales help affirm the titles to such waters? Would there be a market for such water? Against which state's compact allotment would such transactions be counted? Would California, which has been using waters unused in Colorado and Arizona for many decades, be willing to pay something for a longer-term lease that would assure continued delivery for a known period? Would such an arrangement eliminate the pressure for nonsensical "use it or lose it" projects? The status of water allocated to western Indian tribes under the federal reservation doctrine and the Winters decision could be a much larger issue in the next decade .
In a river basin context, supplies of water for transfers out of state or rom the Upper Basin to the Lower Basin can come from unused water in excess of deliveries that may be required by compact and from water withdrawn from current consumptive uses . Regarding unused water, it is not clear that conditions for exchange exist, because there is no practical way to withhold the water ; nor is it clear that the Upper Basin can egally claim water that it cannot use consumptively . The water cannot he stored unless there is a consumptive use, and it will continue flowing downstream anyway. The only motivation for making a contract on such water would be to guarantee that consumptive uses will not be developed over a specified time so that continued downstream availability could be guaranteed . Table 5 .5 showed the mean annual discharge of unused water originating in each subbasin of the Upper Colorado Basin . Out-of-basin parties willing to pay the Upper Basin not to develop this excess water (averaging 2,894,000 acre-feet per year) would naturally be concerned about the reliability of this supply . However, there is so much storage on e main-stem Colorado and its major tributaries (55 .6 maf of active storage, approximately 4 .3 years' average flow) that water deliverable below Hoover Dam could be made quite reliable through Bureau of Reclamation storage and release arrangements .
Water could also be transferred out of the Upper Basin through transfer of established water rights that are currently being used . Only agriultural rights are relevant to potential transfers because of their relatively low value, and they represent 70 percent of total diversions and more than 90 percent of total consumptive use . The annual consumptive use of water by crop in each subbasin and the associated net return to the larm enterprise per acre-foot of consumptive use were presented in Table 5 . 13 . These data permit construction of a crude supply curve of water from existing agricultural uses, assuming that offer prices in excess of the net returns experienced per acre-foot consumed will, sooner or later, induce farmers to sell that water . For each subbasin, such a supply curve can be constructed by arranging the crops in increasing order of net return and cumulating the quantities of water that would be forthcoming at that net return (or lower) .
Based on the data of Table 5 .13, a supply, or offer, curve is constructed for the Upper Basin, using $5 offering price intervals and cumulating the amounts of water that might be forthcoming at each offering price (see Table 5 .20) .
The conclusion is that lots of water is likely to be forthcoming from the agricultural sector at relatively low prices if the process is not subject to state control . The above data represent a private agricultural sector point of view of accounting stance, that is, private profitability as a criterion for giving up irrigation water . However, from a state or overall Upper Basin viewpoint, things look quite different, as shown earlier in Table 5 . 15 . In the various subbasins, average state income losses per acre-foot consumed range from $74 to $160 per acre-foot . A regional official looking at Table 5 .15 would be concerned that the loss of regional income would not be made up by new water-using activities (that might be out-of-state) or that the proceeds to the seller might not be reinvested in the state . Transfers that are highly beneficial from a national stance and are modestly beneficial from a private stance can be perceived as highly harmful to the economy of the exporting region .
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This difference will continue to be a major point-of contention regarding out-of-state or out-of-basin sales .
Principal findings and policy recommendations
Principal findings The Upper Colorado River Basin is not and under foreseeable circumstances will not be short of water for consumptive uses . Estimated current consumptive uses per year total 2 .7 maf (Spofford et al ., 1980, chap. 6, modified) , including those associated with publicly supplied waters, rural domestic and livestock supplies, irrigation, self-supplied industrial uses, thermal-electric generation, tributary groundwater use, and export . Table 5 .21 indicates the Upper Basin and state availabilities for consumptive use under three assumed values for average virgin flow. The 13 .5 maf estimate is the lowest in current use, but because there are periods of persistent low flow, the effects of a repetition of the lowest ten-year flow in this century (from 1931 to 1940) are considered . Only in the latter case could there be a shortage . Then, the annual shortage could be met by net releases from the 50 maf of active storage on the river and the reallocation of water from agriculture to other uses in order to avoid serious damage to the nonagricultural sectors .
It should also be noted that the average excess outflows from the Upper Basin of 2,890,000 acre-feet (Table 5 .5) exhibit high year-to-year Lowest ten-year flow in the twentieth century (Dracup, 1977, p . 121 variability as a source of supply for the Upper Basin, capable of being regulated only at high cost . However, these same supplies can be regulated and made available to the Lower Basin at no additional cost (as they are today) through the vast amount of storage on the river system . Low-valued agricultural uses consume approximately 31 percent of the water available to the Upper Basin (that is, 1 .6 maf, Table 5 .8, out of 5.2 maf, Table 5 .21) . The values of these waters in terms of net farm income per acre-foot consumed range up to $72 but average $25 per acre-foot . On the other hand, if some of this water were to be transferred out of the Upper Basin, there would be somewhat larger impacts on state incomes, ranging from $75 to $160 per acre-foot (Table 5 .15) . These estimated state income effects stem from a "worst case" scenario and do not take into account the positive income effects of new in-basin uses or the possibility that agricultural sellers might reinvest their sales proceeds in Upper Basin activities . As more market incentives are felt to transfer agricultural water, this conflict between individual willingness to sell and state concern will escalate, with the states (rightly or wrongly) increasingly opposing transfers that are privately profitable, especially out of state.
Instream value of waters currently consumed in the Upper Basin, when viewed from the standpoint of the entire Colorado Basin, are quite high, often surpassing even the state income values that may be associated with the consumptive uses . These values arise from the effects on water quality, water-based recreation, fish and wildlife values (beyond direct recreational values), hydroelectric power generation, and Lower Basin irrigation uses . Some of these values have not been quantified in monetary terms, but it is possible to place values on the hydroelectric power effects, the value of the water to Lower Basin irrigators, and the water quality effects . The hydroelectric values were shown to range from $31 to $46 per acre-foot, depending on the subbasin of origin (Table  5. f water allocation among uses is called for by the differences between these values and the private and state income values mentioned earlier .
Bureau of Reclamation electric power generated within the Colorado 'ver Storage Project sells at extremely low prices, an average of only 11 ills per kilowatt hour . Compare this figure with the cost-avoided prices eing paid for cogenerated power of around 44 mills or, in the extreme, e approximate full cost of electric energy from newly constructed coald thermal electric plants (being built in the Southwest) of 8 .5 cents (85 mills) per kilowatt hour . Such underpricing leads to misallocation of nergy resources and energy-related investments, and it shortchanges he regions that provide the water for the hydroelectric generation . A basic motivational problem is created by the fact that most of these "astream values accrue not to the Upper Basin but to the Lower Basin nd wider areas that use the power. The high levels of dissolved solids in the Lower Basin have been seen o cause quite significant damage, approximately $0 .5 million per mg per liter of water (Gardner, 1983 ) . Yet, the Colorado River Salinity Control Program is failing to make adequate use of the most cost-effecive methods of reducing salinity : changes in on-farm irrigation water anagement and the retirement of irrigated land in areas that contribte huge amounts of salt through their return flows (Table 5 .19) . The vasons for this failure are again motivational : the Bureau of Reclamation and the Soil Conservation Service find administering on-farm prorams for large numbers of farmers difficult compared to constructing large point-source projects, although the farmers themselves prefer proects whose costs they do not share .
"There exists no basinwide agency that is concerned with or is able to study and influence the pattern of public values and negative exterialities noted above, that is, the impacts of changes in Upper Basin water tse on Lower Basin users. Results of the absence of such oversight include increased Upper Basin fear of Lower Basin political power over the use of water, a consequent "hurry up, build any kind of project" ttitude, lack of concern with substantial Lower Basin losses and power jo .,ses, and fear of considering ways for reallocating water over the short 'and long terms to the mutual benefit of all parts of the basin .
Further, it seems clear that there exists an unexploited potential in the ;tipper Basin for an increased role for water markets . Although water markets cannot solve all problems, they can provide the flexibility in water allocation that economic and demographic change necessitates . State water agencies can facilitate an expanded market function by providing information (for example, where there are excess water and shortages); there is also a need for public monitoring of the water market process in order to ensure important public values . Cases of successful markets need to be studied with an eye to replication .
Colorado lags behind the other Upper Basin states in relying on the water court system to deal with water reallocation and in having no mechanism for guarding public values . All the Upper Basin states lack the tools for reflecting instream values adequately . The water laws of all the states fail to recognize conservation as a beneficial use ; they in fact encourage inefficient uses .
Policy recommendations : basinwide 1. Because there exists no river basin agency with interest in and responsibility for monitoring and overseeing the entire Colorado River Basin, and in light of the potential benefits to be gained from the existence of such an agency as noted above, it is recommended that the Colorado River Basin states that are signatory to the Colorado River Compact consider establishment of an interstate river basin commission along the lines of the Potomac and the Delaware river basin commissions, to act as a focal point for study, exchange of information, continuing dialogue, and enforcement and monitoring of agreed-upon policies . Basinwide management implies the need for basinwide compensatory arrangements so that all parties can benefit from both water planning and water transfers .
2. In light of the excess water supply in the Upper Basin that will be costly to develop for Upper Basin purposes but is now regulated through storage for Lower Basin use at almost no cost, and given the Upper Basin fears that are leading to the costly development of inefficient consumptive uses, it is recommended that thought be given to mechanisms needed to negotiate a long-term agreement with the Lower Basin states, especially California, by which the Upper Basin would be paid to agree not to develop new uses for a portion of the water during a specified time .
3 . In light of the low private values generated by much of the consumptive water use in the Upper Basin and the likely opposition of state governments to transfers out of agriculture under current institutional arrangements, it is recommended that : a. studies be undertaken to quantify the direct and indirect recreational values generated in the Upper Basin by added streamflows ; b. hydroelectric prices for power from the Colorado River Storage Project be raised toward market levels ; and c. revenues from CRSP power sales be shared proportionally among the The Upper Colorado River Basin 223
Upper Basin states, thereby providing them with badly needed revenues and motivating them to recognize instream values.
Policy recommendations : state level 4. Because appropriations doctrine fails to recognize conservation as a beneficial use of water, thereby denying the owner any reward for increased efficiency in use, it is recommended that the Upper Basin states consider legislation such as the Katz-Bates bill in California (1983) that so recognizes water conservation . This change would be doubly effective in motivating on-farm water management change that also reduces return flows and their dissolved solids loads . It would also motivate retirement of unproductive acreage .
5. The salinity management program is unable to motivate on-farm measures and acreage retirement sufficiently . Cost sharing as practiced by the Soil Conservation Service is not adequate because farmers resist any increase in cost that does not provide directly offsetting benefits . Although Recommendation 3 above will help, it is recommended that further steps be taken to redefine "beneficial use" in a way that reflects t he availability of modern water management methods available at modcrate costs . Beneficial use should require reasonable water control meth-4 )ds and should be differentially defined among areas to reflect special attributes of each area, especially where return flows are extremely saline .
6. To facilitate market transactions but simultaneously to give weight to those public values not reflected fully in private values (water quality, aesthetics, species preservation, public recreation, etc .), it is recommended that the riparian states consider changing to the New Mexico system under which the office of the state engineer, rather than the water courts, monitors water transfers, carries out needed hydrologic studies, and imposes public interest criteria . This change would decrease transactions costs of transfers while protecting public values .
7. In all Upper Basin states, it is recommended that the state engiiieer's office facilitate water transfers by providing information on local water availability and shortage . Systems such as Colorado's satellitelinked water monitoring system can provide valuable information for this purpose .
8 . It is recommended that an agency of state government stand ready to buy water rights at stated prices from designated low productivityhigh salinity lands to facilitate the retirement of those lands . The water would be either sold or retained by the state for instream flow maintenance . 9 . It is recommended that efficiently working markets such as the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District be carefully studied with an eye to their extension to all conservancy and irrigation districts .
The real issues confronting the Colorado Basin are primarily institutional, not technical . More research, including actual experimentation, should be devoted to institutional-motivational design . A basinwide institution is needed to identify and negotiate "win-win" changes in water allocation and management for all parts of the basin . These are exciting challenges .
Appendix : Detailed derivation of state income impacts
Use of a state input-output (1-0) model allows analysis of the forward and backward linkages from irrigated agriculture to other sectors of the state economy . An analysis of the effects of the withdrawal of water currently consumed in agriculture in Colorado and Utah has been undertaken . Because of economic proximity, it is assumed then that Grand County, Utah, and all the San Juan River Basin are part of Colorado . No 1-0 table from Wyoming is available .
Colorado has a well-developed economy characterized by a high degree of interdependence among the various producing sectors . The 28-sector Colorado 1-0 model based on 1970 data is taken from Gray and McKean (1975) . The flows of five sectors are shown in Table 5 . 22 . The household sector was included so that wage and salary income changes could be estimated and consumer multiplier effects included . To estimate the state income effect of withdrawing an acre-foot of water from agriculture in Colorado, one needs to use both the inputoutput model and certain judgments . To illustrate our calculations, we work through a typical sequence of assumptions and calculations for a reduction of irrigation output in western Colorado . First we observe that 92 percent of irrigated agriculture's output is used for livestock, for food rocessing, and for consumption and export . Because the irrigated crops on the Western Slope are primarily forage crops and feed grains, it appears reasonable to eliminate the direct linkage to food processing .
Because the technical coefficient for the input from irrigated agriculture per dollar of livestock output is 0 .2, a $1 reduction in irrigated agriculture deliveries to livestock may cause as much as a $5 (1/0.2) reduction in livestock output if no substitutes are available . However, complete absence of substitutes seems unlikely, so we assume that oneltalf the reduction of irrigated agriculture inputs into the livestock sector will be substituted by imported supplies . The reduction of $1 of Colorado irrigated inputs into the livestock sector would then cause a $2 .50 reduction in livestock output.
Livestock output is mainly for the food-processing sector (62 percent) ; the remainder is largely inputs to itself (cow-calf outputs into range livestock, etc .) . Thus, each $1 reduction in livestock output would result in a $0 .62 reduction in deliveries to food processing . Because the input coefficient for livestock into food processing is 0 .33, the reduction in food processing output would be $ 1 .89 (0 .62/0 .33) .
In summary, as a consequence of our assumptions about the structure of the regional economy of western Colorado, a $1 reduction in irrigated agricultural output would exhibit the following consequences : (1) $0 .11 represents a reduction in deliveries in final uses ; (2) $0 .89 comes from ivestock, causing a $2 .23 reduction in livestock output ; (3) the $2 .23 reduction in livestock output causes a $1 .38 ($0 .62 X $2.23) reduction in livestock deliveries to food processing ; (4) the $2 .23 reduction in livestock output also causes a $0 .85 ($0.38 x $2 .23) reduction in deliveries to final uses ; and (5) the $1 .38 reduction in livestock deliveries to food )rocessing may lead to a $4 .18 (1 .38/0 .33) reduction in food-processing output that then represents a reduction in deliveries to final demand )ecause processing output is mostly exported .
The direct and indirect state income effects of these reductions in deliveries to final demand depend upon the average reductions in outIruts by the various sectors and the related reductions in wage and salary payments and financial payments . In particular, the reduction in wage and salary payments to the household sector for each dollar reduction in The phasing out of crops in each subbasin is assumed to be in ascending order of private profitability, as in Similar calculations for Utah resulted in a Utah multiplier of 1 .34, that is, for each dollar of reduction in irrigated grain output, state income will fall $1 .34 .
These multipliers have been derived from state input-output tables, each representing the entire state . Colorado, on average, has a more integrated, more extensive economy, leading to its higher multiplier . However, the Upper Basin areas of the two states are somewhat isolated from the more highly developed parts of each state and are, in fact, closely linked because of physical proximity . Thus, multiplier effects should be similar throughout the basin, rather than differing across the (arbitrarily designated) state lines . We judge that Colorado's multiplier is too high for the region and Utah's is somewhat low (partly because of lack of information on some of the financial payments) . We have chosen the average of the two multipliers, 1 .80 , to estimate the state income impacts throughout the Upper basin .
It is now possible to evaluate the effects on the Upper Basin economy if water is transferred out of agriculture . The estimated income losses are expressed per acre-foot of reduced consumptive use in Table 5 .23 .
The first line for each subbasin gives the cumulative amount of water used by the crops, and the second line shows the loss in basin income per consumptive acre-foot for that particular crop . (Note : the order of crops by value is that shown in Tables 5 .6-5 . 13 .) The third line represents the cumulative loss in basin income as the various crops are progressively phased out . The average loss of basin income per acre-foot of consumptive use for each subbasin is given in the last column, the range being $75 to $160 . This range represents what the local area might expect to lose in income as water is moved out of agriculture . It seems unlikely that offsetting investments in new industries will take place in the same area .
From the state point of view, the water withdrawn might support new industries in the state, but whether it will is quite uncertain . If the water is transferred out of state, the above state income losses are likely .
The private values of water consumed, ranging from zero to $72 per The Upper Colorado River Basin 229 acre-foot (Table 5 .13), contrast sharply with possible state income loss of $57-$490 ( The 1980 population of the entire region was 12 .01 million, compared with a prewar (1940) total of only 2 .9 million . Over the past 40 years, the dramatic growth in population, which has averaged 10 percent annually, has been fueled by a variety of factors, including a favorable climate and the rise of defense and aerospace-related industry . This growth was achieved despite the severe limitations of local water supplies .
Mean annual precipitation in the region averages only 14 inches . Over the period of record, annual precipitation has been quite variable, ranging between 5 and 38 inches annually . In addition, the area has a typically Mediterranean climate in which rainfall occurs predominantly between November and April . As a consequence, there exists not only a dearth of locally generated water supplies but an incongruity between the winter period, when those supplies are more readily available, and the summer period, when water demands are at a peak .
The modern history of the region has been characterized by the development of supplemental water supplies and the storage facilities necessary to regulate water flows so as to redress the natural imbalance between periods of peak supply and peak demands . The physical manifestations of this development include three major aqueducts that, with their associated storage facilities, `permit the South Coast Basin to import water from the Colorado River, the Central Valley of California, and the Owens Valley to the northeast . A major justification for the development of all these facilities rested on the proposition that water is necessary to support continued population growth and related economic development . This view was probably most succinctly stated by the legendary William Mulholland, who observed at one point during the con-
